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The purpose of this paper is to integrate mobile supply and demand on an economic basis and to model the economic value of additional data capacity, spectrum demand and data growth under a range of parameter and policy assumptions.

The modelling requires an iterative solution to find an equilibrium between supply and demand, which allows data demand to be bootstrapped, i.e. determined endogenously within the model.

The sensitivity of the model to input parameter changes differs from a modelling approach where data demand is assumed to be exogenous, whilst in some instances, the sign of the relationship is reversed, e.g. the response of economic value to mobile site cost changes.

The approach suggests a research agenda to estimate willingness to pay for data and the price elasticity of data demand, and may also suggest new explanatory variables to test econometrically in relation to spectrum value.

The approach provides a different route to spectrum valuation and allows estimation of the economic impacts of a range of policy questions.

This paper provides the integration of supply and demand and endogenous estimation of data demand and economic value, coupled with quantitative assessment of a range of policy questions.

The purpose of this paper is to introduce a new regulatory tool which is intermediate between an ex ante price control and no price control.

The approach adopted utilises public sources and first-hand experience in relation to the development and implementation of anchor product regulation.

Anchor product regulation is found to be an effective alternative to price control, particularly in the context of copper-fibre transition in access networks. The approach is less demanding in terms of information than a price control to implement, and evidence from the UK suggests that anchor product regulation improved investment incentives.

The degree of substitution between anchor products and other access products could be investigated where anchor product regulation has been implemented.

Anchor product regulation is a practical tool which regulators can apply.

Anchor product regulation is a new concept, and this paper for the first time sets out the motivation for anchor product regulation, its development and experience in terms of implementation.

Oil film thickness measurements made in the front main bearing of an operating 3.8 L, V‐6 engine were compared with rheological measurements made on a series of commercial and experimental oil blends. High‐temperature, high‐shear‐rate viscosity measurements correlated with the film thickness of all single‐grade and many multigrade oils. However, the film thickness provided by some multigrade oils were larger than could be accounted for by their high‐temperature, high‐shear‐rate viscosities alone. Although the pressure/viscosity coefficients of some of the oils were significantly different from those of the majority of oils tested, they were not oils which produced unusual film thicknesses. As a consequence, correcting oil viscosities for the esimated pressures acting within the bearing was unsuccessful in improving the correlations. The correlations were improved, however, by accounting for the elastic properties of the multigrade oils. Measurements of oil relaxation times at high temperatures and shear rates showed large differences in elastic properties among the test oils. A good correlation (R2 = 0.73) was obtained from a multiple linear regression of film thickness as a function of both high‐temperature, high‐shear‐rate viscosities and relaxation times.

Discusses public policy exceptions for the majority (43 out of 50) of states in the USA, as against at‐will employment. Lists the 11 states that recognise good faith and fair dealing. Comments on public policy exception, implied contract exception, and good faith and fair dealing exception, with explanations of these. Gives some recommendations for employers such as a well‐written employee manual and the use of preventative measures. Sums up that firms should review how they extend job offers to future employees and how they communicate promotion offers to existing employees.

Stock options, once exclusive to executives, are now becoming more broad based to include middle management and non‐management employees. In 2000 an estimated 10 million workers’ compensation packages contained stock options. In today’s competitive environment, firms are looking for ways to attract and retain workers, reward outstanding performance, and return value to shareholders while minimising costs. Stock options provide such a vehicle. The paradox is that while stock options are intended to tie pay to performance, many employees lack the knowledge of how the options actually work. Employees need to be educated as to the different types of plans and how it affects their total compensation. A contentious debate exists over whether firms actually benefit from stock options plans and the reasons why some prosper while others fail. Researchers and experts agree that the success of a stock option plan lies largely in how effective firms are at managing the plan and communicating it to its employees.

What rules, if any, should regulators put in place to provide incentives for timely and efficient investment in next generation fibre access networks (NGA) while, at the same time, preventing monopoly abuse, either by taking monopoly rents from end users or harming downstream competition? This paper aims to focus on these issues.

The findings in this paper are based on review of existing work in the area and on interviews with 25 operators and regulators across the European Union.

Active (bitstream) remedies will be important for preserving competition in the supply of retail, NGA‐based, products. Regulators should specify the price regulation principles, which would apply to operators found to have significant market power (SMP) in NGA supply in advance of any market definition and SMP assessment. Regulators should allow access providers to provide distinct NGA‐based bitstream products to meet the needs of different segments of the end‐user market and to then charge for these products at the wholesale level so as to reflect their value to end users rather than their costs.

This paper is designed to simulate general debate on the best way to regulate NGA

Assesses the effect of the introduction of the euro on capital markets, noting “explosive growth” in the corporate bond market and a rising demand for junk bonds. Believes that equities are funamentally strong, although foreign investors have suffered from falling euro values, and sees some signs that investors within the eurozone are diversifying away from their home markets. Gives statistics on the growth in derivatives trading, splitting it by types of contract; and considers why the consolidation of stock and futures exchanges has been slower than expected. Discusses the implications of capital m arket unification for investment allocation and expects an increasing emphasis on sector analysis as national stock indices coverage; but points out that country factors, e.g. fiscal reforms, still remain.

To assess the impact of TCE on the field of strategy, we first quantified the distribution of TCE-related research articles across all disciplines and fields. Specifically, we identified every article that appeared in a journal included in the Institute for Scientific Information's (ISI's) Web of Knowledge between 1975 and 2008 and that included among its keywords some variation of “transaction costs.” We then removed those articles for which this term clearly did not refer to transaction costs of the Coasean kind (primarily articles in finance and computing, for which “transaction cost” has a different meaning). Finally, we categorized each journal according to its discipline or field. Granted, this requires some judgment, but we attempted to be objective in our categorizations.¹ As Table 1 shows, articles that are self-described as part of the TCE research stream have appeared more frequently in strategy journals than in the journals of any other discipline or field. We interpret this as evidence of TCE's impact on strategy, and of the importance of the strategy field to TCE.

According to TCE, different forms of economic organization – markets, hierarchies, hybrid forms of various kinds, etc. – are characterized by different “syndromes of attributes,” or coherent sets of features (Williamson, 1991). Because each form of organization implements a distinctive set of governance features, each is efficient for a different type of transaction, implying trade-offs among the forms. The two key categories of features are the allocation of decision-making authority among and within firms and the intensity of the incentives facing firms and members of them. By concentrating decision-making authority, hierarchies have the benefit of facilitating “cooperative adaptation”; that is, coordinated change among two or more parties. Adaptation to new economic circumstances is, after all, the main function of an economic system (Hayek, 1945). Hierarchies are said to facilitate cooperative adaptation better than markets because unlike for markets, courts will not intervene in internal disputes and fiat is available as a last resort. This leaves more scope for the management hierarchy to use its authority to promote cooperative adaptation to unanticipated circumstances (Williamson, 1975, 1991). On the other hand, hierarchies feature weaker incentive intensity, that is, weaker links between individual or unit performance and individual or unit reward. This is because market-like levels of incentive intensity would inhibit cooperative adaptation by stimulating “autonomous adaptation” instead. Autonomous adaptation refers to adaptation by individual firms or organizational members that occurs without regard to its effects on other parties. Williamson (1985) also argues that market-like incentives lack credibility within hierarchies due to the ultimate availability of fiat. Thus, for TCE, the most fundamental trade-off between various forms of internal organization is between cooperative adaptation and incentive intensity.

A key argument in transaction cost economics (TCE) is that transactions are aligned with governance structures so as to effect a discriminating – mainly transaction cost economizing – match (Williamson, 1991). The archetypical problem in TCE is the vertical integration or “make-versus-buy” decision, and the focus of transaction cost economizing in this context is on mitigation of “holdup” problems associated with investments in specific assets (Klein, Crawford, & Alchian, 1978; Williamson, 1985). However, this asset specificity condition in only one example (albeit a significant one) of a more general class of contractual hazards. Indeed, in his most recent discussion of the TCE agenda, Williamson (1996, p. 3) suggests that “identification, explication, and mitigation of contractual hazards – which take many forms, many of which long went unremarked – are central to the exercise.”